Ebook: Social Choice and Bargaining Perspectives on Distributive Justice

It is probably fair to say that there does not exist a unique and generally accepted not ion of justice. Even if one confines oneself to economic justice one can still get many answers to the question of how justice - henceforth we shall use the term "distributive justice" ­ should be defined and characterized. This may be disappointing for the outside observer but one can also view this as achallenge, at least as long as one thinks that distributive justice is an issue economics should be concerned with. Many problems of distributive justice can be described as follows: There is a fixed collection of well-defined objects (usually commodi­ ties) which are quantitatively measurable and perfectly divisible. This collection is to be divided up among a certain number of individuals, the members of society, let 's say. According to which principles or rules should this distribution be carried out? Should people be rewarded according to their ability or according to their needs? Should the distribution be such that nobody envies the bundle of any other member of society? Should the collection of entities be distributed in a way that yields the greatest benefi.

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This book studies two distinct approaches to distributive justice. The firstoriginates from axiomatic social choice theory and studies positionalist aggregation functions. Profiles of individual extended orderings over alternative social states are mapped into a social ordering of these states. The informational framework of this procedure is ordinal and requires interpersonal comparisons of utility levels. The aggregation mechanism which is proposed can be characterized as a generalized ranking rule with a nonlinear weighting scheme, allowing an equity axiom to be satisfied. The second approach is rooted in axiomatic bargaining theory and uses cardinal individual utilities which are not required to be interpersonally comparable. The second path leads to a new characterization of the Gauthier solution for n persons that can suitably bedefined as a lexicographical maximin solution in relative utility gains. Again, an equity axiom proves to be useful. Both approaches are subjected to empirical investigations. In the first one, results from questionnaires are presented. In the second one, findings from laboratory experiments are discussed.