Ebook: The Metaphysics of Science-1: An Account of Modern Science in Terms of Principles, Laws and Theories

The roots of this work lie in my earlier book, Scientific Progress, which first appeared in 1981. One of its topics, the distinction - tween scientific laws and theories, is there treated with reference to the same distinction as drawn by N. R. Campbell in his Physics: The Elements. Shortly after completing Scientific Progress, I read Rom Harré’s The Principles of Scientific Thinking, in which the concept of theory is even more clearly delineated than in Campbell, being directly connected to the notion of a model – as it was in my book. In subsequent considerations regarding science, Harré’s work thus - came my main source of inspiration with regard to theories, while Campbell’s remained my main source with respect to empirical laws. Around the same time I also read William Whewell’s Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences. In this work, Whewell depicts principles as playing a central role in the formation of science, and conceives of them in much the same way as Kant conceives of fundamental synthetic a priori judgements. The idea that science should have principles as a basic element immediately made sense to me, and from that time I have thought of science in terms of laws, theories and principles.

The Metaphysics of Science provides a clear, well-founded conception of modern science, according to which its core consists of particular metaphysical principles. On this view, both the empirical and the theoretical aspects of science are the result of the attempt to apply these metaphysical principles to reality. There is a flexibility in the application of the principles, however, so that, in their scientific guise, they may come to be reformed over time through scientific revolutions.

This approach to modern science provides a unified conception of the enterprise, explaining such of its various aspects as the principle of induction, the nature of scientific knowledge and scientific reduction, the fundamental difference between the natural and social sciences, and the role of essentialism with respect to natural kinds. Furthermore, it provides a resolution of the long-standing debate between empiricism and realism. In this regard, and in others, the view of science advanced in this work is not only novel, but constitutes an alternative that is superior to both the empirical-analytic and the sociology of knowledge approaches that are prevalent today.