Ebook: How to Know: A Practicalist Conception of Knowledge

Some key aspects of contemporary epistemology deserve to be challenged, and How to Know does just that. This book argues that several long-standing presumptions at the heart of the standard analytic conception of knowledge are false, and defends an alternative, a practicalist conception of knowledge.

• Presents a philosophically original conception of knowledge, at odds with some central tenets of analytic epistemology
• Offers a dissolution of epistemology’s infamous Gettier problem — explaining why the supposed problem was never really a problem in the first place.
• Defends an unorthodox conception of the relationship between knowledge-that and knowledge-how, understanding knowledge-that as a kind of knowledge-how.

Content:
Chapter 1 The Standard Analytic Conception of Knowledge (pages 1–25):
Chapter 2 Knowledge?That as Knowledge?How (pages 26–75):
Chapter 3 Gettier? No Problem (pages 76–128):
Chapter 4 Is this a World Where Knowledge has to Include Justification? (pages 129–168):
Chapter 5 Knowledge?That as How?Knowledge (pages 169–218):
Chapter 6 A Practicalist Conception of Knowledge (pages 219–240):