Ebook: Conflicts and Cooperation in Managing Environmental Resources

The use of environmental resources involves strategic be- havior of self-interested agents, bargaining, cooperation and other efforts to provokeor settle conflicts. In order to model conflicts and cooperation in managingthese resources most papers contained in the book make use of advanced game theoretic concepts. The first six contributions investigate conceptual issues of international conflicts and cooperation while the other four address conflicts and cooperation arising in the context of monitoring and enforcing environmental controls. The emphasis is on demonstrating how new developments in economic (game) theory can fruitfully be applied to important environmental issues. Descriptive as well as normative approaches are presented. In the context of international environmental problems attention is focused on the consequences of non-cooperative behavior and on the incentives for, and barrieres to, the emergence of cooperation. Incomplete implementation of environmental controls can be attributed, to some extent, to failures of monitoring and enforcement which, in turn, raises the issue of designing institutional arrangements allowing for (more) effective enforcement. Students and researchers with a working knowledge of economic theory can expect to learn how complex issues of economic-environmental interaction are successfully tackled by advanced (game) theoretic methods.

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The use of environmental resources involves strategic be- havior of self-interested agents, bargaining, cooperation and other efforts to provokeor settle conflicts. In order to model conflicts and cooperation in managingthese resources most papers contained in the book make use of advanced game theoretic concepts. The first six contributions investigate conceptual issues of international conflicts and cooperation while the other four address conflicts and cooperation arising in the context of monitoring and enforcing environmental controls. The emphasis is on demonstrating how new developments in economic (game) theory can fruitfully be applied to important environmental issues. Descriptive as well as normative approaches are presented. In the context of international environmental problems attention is focused on the consequences of non-cooperative behavior and on the incentives for, and barrieres to, the emergence of cooperation. Incomplete implementation of environmental controls can be attributed, to some extent, to failures of monitoring and enforcement which, in turn, raises the issue of designing institutional arrangements allowing for (more) effective enforcement. Students and researchers with a working knowledge of economic theory can expect to learn how complex issues of economic-environmental interaction are successfully tackled by advanced (game) theoretic methods.
Content:
Front Matter....Pages I-XII
Editor’s Introduction....Pages 1-8
Front Matter....Pages 9-9
International Environmental Agreements as Games....Pages 11-37
Emission Taxes in a Dynamic International Game of CO2 Emissions....Pages 39-70
Critical Loads and International Environmental Cooperation....Pages 71-83
Environmental Conflicts and Strategic Commitment....Pages 85-110
The Choice of Environmental Policy Instruments and Strategic International Trade....Pages 111-132
Economic Models of Optimal Energy Use under Global Environmental Constraints....Pages 133-191
Front Matter....Pages 193-193
Monitoring and Enforcement of Pollution Control Laws in Europe and the United States....Pages 195-219
The Economics of Negotiations on Water Quality -An Application of Principal Agent Theory....Pages 221-239
Monitoring the Emission of Pollutants by Means of the Inspector Leadership Method....Pages 241-273
Illegal Pollution and Monitoring of Unknown Quality — A Signaling Game Approach —....Pages 275-332
Back Matter....Pages 333-338

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The use of environmental resources involves strategic be- havior of self-interested agents, bargaining, cooperation and other efforts to provokeor settle conflicts. In order to model conflicts and cooperation in managingthese resources most papers contained in the book make use of advanced game theoretic concepts. The first six contributions investigate conceptual issues of international conflicts and cooperation while the other four address conflicts and cooperation arising in the context of monitoring and enforcing environmental controls. The emphasis is on demonstrating how new developments in economic (game) theory can fruitfully be applied to important environmental issues. Descriptive as well as normative approaches are presented. In the context of international environmental problems attention is focused on the consequences of non-cooperative behavior and on the incentives for, and barrieres to, the emergence of cooperation. Incomplete implementation of environmental controls can be attributed, to some extent, to failures of monitoring and enforcement which, in turn, raises the issue of designing institutional arrangements allowing for (more) effective enforcement. Students and researchers with a working knowledge of economic theory can expect to learn how complex issues of economic-environmental interaction are successfully tackled by advanced (game) theoretic methods.
Content:
Front Matter....Pages I-XII
Editor’s Introduction....Pages 1-8
Front Matter....Pages 9-9
International Environmental Agreements as Games....Pages 11-37
Emission Taxes in a Dynamic International Game of CO2 Emissions....Pages 39-70
Critical Loads and International Environmental Cooperation....Pages 71-83
Environmental Conflicts and Strategic Commitment....Pages 85-110
The Choice of Environmental Policy Instruments and Strategic International Trade....Pages 111-132
Economic Models of Optimal Energy Use under Global Environmental Constraints....Pages 133-191
Front Matter....Pages 193-193
Monitoring and Enforcement of Pollution Control Laws in Europe and the United States....Pages 195-219
The Economics of Negotiations on Water Quality -An Application of Principal Agent Theory....Pages 221-239
Monitoring the Emission of Pollutants by Means of the Inspector Leadership Method....Pages 241-273
Illegal Pollution and Monitoring of Unknown Quality — A Signaling Game Approach —....Pages 275-332
Back Matter....Pages 333-338
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