Ebook: Executive Compensation and Shareholder Value: Theory and Evidence

Executive compensation has gained widespread public attention in recent years, with the pay of top U.S. executives reaching unprecedented levels compared either with past levels, with the remuneration of top executives in other countries, or with the wages and salaries of typical employees. The extraordinary levels of executive compensation have been achieved at a time when U.S. public companies have realized substantial gains in stock market value. Many have cited this as evidence that U.S. executive compensation works well, rewarding managers who make difficult decisions that lead to higher shareholder values, while others have argued that the overly generous salaries and benefits bear little relation to company performance. Recent conceptual and empirical research permits for the first time a truly rigorous debate on these and related issues, which is the subject of this volume.

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Executive compensation has gained widespread public attention in recent years, with the pay of top U.S. executives reaching unprecedented levels compared either with past levels, with the remuneration of top executives in other countries, or with the wages and salaries of typical employees. The extraordinary levels of executive compensation have been achieved at a time when U.S. public companies have realized substantial gains in stock market value. Many have cited this as evidence that U.S. executive compensation works well, rewarding managers who make difficult decisions that lead to higher shareholder values, while others have argued that the overly generous salaries and benefits bear little relation to company performance. Recent conceptual and empirical research permits for the first time a truly rigorous debate on these and related issues, which is the subject of this volume.

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Executive compensation has gained widespread public attention in recent years, with the pay of top U.S. executives reaching unprecedented levels compared either with past levels, with the remuneration of top executives in other countries, or with the wages and salaries of typical employees. The extraordinary levels of executive compensation have been achieved at a time when U.S. public companies have realized substantial gains in stock market value. Many have cited this as evidence that U.S. executive compensation works well, rewarding managers who make difficult decisions that lead to higher shareholder values, while others have argued that the overly generous salaries and benefits bear little relation to company performance. Recent conceptual and empirical research permits for the first time a truly rigorous debate on these and related issues, which is the subject of this volume.
Content:
Front Matter....Pages i-ix
Front Matter....Pages 1-1
Top executive incentives in Germany, Japan and the USA: a comparison....Pages 3-12
Corporate governance, executive pay and performance in Europe....Pages 13-33
A better way to pay CEOs?....Pages 35-46
The winner-takes-all: an alternative view of CEO incentives....Pages 47-52
Front Matter....Pages 53-53
Dual agency: corporate boards with reciprocally interlocking relationships....Pages 55-75
Discussion of Hallock paper on reciprocal interlocks....Pages 77-79
Front Matter....Pages 81-81
The rise and fall of executive share options in Britain....Pages 83-113
Patterns of stock option exercise in the United States....Pages 115-142
Discussant comments....Pages 143-146
Discussant comments....Pages 147-148
Back Matter....Pages 149-159

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Executive compensation has gained widespread public attention in recent years, with the pay of top U.S. executives reaching unprecedented levels compared either with past levels, with the remuneration of top executives in other countries, or with the wages and salaries of typical employees. The extraordinary levels of executive compensation have been achieved at a time when U.S. public companies have realized substantial gains in stock market value. Many have cited this as evidence that U.S. executive compensation works well, rewarding managers who make difficult decisions that lead to higher shareholder values, while others have argued that the overly generous salaries and benefits bear little relation to company performance. Recent conceptual and empirical research permits for the first time a truly rigorous debate on these and related issues, which is the subject of this volume.
Content:
Front Matter....Pages i-ix
Front Matter....Pages 1-1
Top executive incentives in Germany, Japan and the USA: a comparison....Pages 3-12
Corporate governance, executive pay and performance in Europe....Pages 13-33
A better way to pay CEOs?....Pages 35-46
The winner-takes-all: an alternative view of CEO incentives....Pages 47-52
Front Matter....Pages 53-53
Dual agency: corporate boards with reciprocally interlocking relationships....Pages 55-75
Discussion of Hallock paper on reciprocal interlocks....Pages 77-79
Front Matter....Pages 81-81
The rise and fall of executive share options in Britain....Pages 83-113
Patterns of stock option exercise in the United States....Pages 115-142
Discussant comments....Pages 143-146
Discussant comments....Pages 147-148
Back Matter....Pages 149-159
....