Ebook: Game Theory, Experience, Rationality: Foundations of Social Sciences, Economics and Ethics. In Honor of John C. Harsanyi
- Tags: Operation Research/Decision Theory, Ethics, Economic Theory, Philosophy of Science, Econometrics
- Series: Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook [1997] 5
- Year: 1998
- Publisher: Springer Netherlands
- Edition: 1
- Language: English
- pdf
When von Neumann's and Morgenstern's Theory of Games and Economic Behavior appeared in 1944, one thought that a complete theory of strategic social behavior had appeared out of nowhere. However, game theory has, to this very day, remained a fast-growing assemblage of models which have gradually been united in a new social theory - a theory that is far from being completed even after recent advances in game theory, as evidenced by the work of the three Nobel Prize winners, John F. Nash, John C. Harsanyi, and Reinhard Selten. Two of them, Harsanyi and Selten, have contributed important articles to the present volume. This book leaves no doubt that the game-theoretical models are on the right track to becoming a respectable new theory, just like the great theories of the twentieth century originated from formerly separate models which merged in the course of decades. For social scientists, the age of great discover ies is not over. The recent advances of today's game theory surpass by far the results of traditional game theory. For example, modem game theory has a new empirical and social foundation, namely, societal experiences; this has changed its methods, its "rationality. " Morgenstern (I worked together with him for four years) dreamed of an encompassing theory of social behavior. With the inclusion of the concept of evolution in mathematical form, this dream will become true. Perhaps the new foundation will even lead to a new name, "conflict theory" instead of "game theory.
This volume collects outstanding contributions to the theory of games, the theory of game-theoretical rationality, and their applications. 27 articles present the new situation and the recent advances in game theory after the award of the Nobel Prize in economics and especially in game theory to John F. Nash, John C. Harsanyi, and Reinhard Selten. Two of them, Harsanyi and Selten, have contributed leading articles to this volume.
In utility and game theory, the question of which rationality governs their methods and the behavior of the agents as well has emerged as one of the most exciting new conceptual foundations of all social sciences. The main aim of this book is to find an answer to this problem. Do we have to give up our belief in the traditional form of deductive and linear rationality in the social sciences in favor of probabilistic and stochastic methods? Which kind of rationality do we, and should we, use when we attempt to practically solve societal problems and conflicts? Quite a few articles in this book address these questions.
The consequences of a new, multi-faceted rationality, which is going to shake the traditional foundation of game theory, decision theory, and utility theory, and, finally, the social sciences in their entirety, are discussed in depth in seven chapters and a preface: `Rationality and the Foundations of the Social Sciences,' `Cooperation and Rationality,' `Rationality and Economics,' `Bayesian Theory and Rationality,' `Evolution and Evolutionary Game Theory,' `Ethics and Game Theory,' and `Applications of Game Theory'.
The contributors include economists, utility and decision theorists, psychologists, sociologists, physicists, philosophers of sciences and probability theorists. They attempt to make their contributions accessible to a wide audience.
The book will interest researchers, teachers and advanced students in the above-mentioned disciplines; it can be used for a one-semester course on the graduate level.
The volume also includes a review section focusing on recent publications on Logical Empiricism and its influence. An autobiographical report on the Vienna Circle by Arne Naess follows the main part of the Yearbook.
An overview of the activities of the Institute Vienna Circle 1997/98 concludes the volume.
This volume collects outstanding contributions to the theory of games, the theory of game-theoretical rationality, and their applications. 27 articles present the new situation and the recent advances in game theory after the award of the Nobel Prize in economics and especially in game theory to John F. Nash, John C. Harsanyi, and Reinhard Selten. Two of them, Harsanyi and Selten, have contributed leading articles to this volume.
In utility and game theory, the question of which rationality governs their methods and the behavior of the agents as well has emerged as one of the most exciting new conceptual foundations of all social sciences. The main aim of this book is to find an answer to this problem. Do we have to give up our belief in the traditional form of deductive and linear rationality in the social sciences in favor of probabilistic and stochastic methods? Which kind of rationality do we, and should we, use when we attempt to practically solve societal problems and conflicts? Quite a few articles in this book address these questions.
The consequences of a new, multi-faceted rationality, which is going to shake the traditional foundation of game theory, decision theory, and utility theory, and, finally, the social sciences in their entirety, are discussed in depth in seven chapters and a preface: `Rationality and the Foundations of the Social Sciences,' `Cooperation and Rationality,' `Rationality and Economics,' `Bayesian Theory and Rationality,' `Evolution and Evolutionary Game Theory,' `Ethics and Game Theory,' and `Applications of Game Theory'.
The contributors include economists, utility and decision theorists, psychologists, sociologists, physicists, philosophers of sciences and probability theorists. They attempt to make their contributions accessible to a wide audience.
The book will interest researchers, teachers and advanced students in the above-mentioned disciplines; it can be used for a one-semester course on the graduate level.
The volume also includes a review section focusing on recent publications on Logical Empiricism and its influence. An autobiographical report on the Vienna Circle by Arne Naess follows the main part of the Yearbook.
An overview of the activities of the Institute Vienna Circle 1997/98 concludes the volume.
Content:
Front Matter....Pages I-X
Introduction....Pages 1-8
Game Theory, Experience, Rationality....Pages 9-34
Counterproductive Rationality....Pages 35-48
Rationally Coping with Lapses from Rationality....Pages 49-53
Do Rational People Make Mistakes....Pages 55-66
Rationality and Knavery....Pages 67-79
Structural Rationality in Game Theory....Pages 81-93
Attractions to and Repulsions from Chance....Pages 95-107
Agreeing to Disagree: Harsanyi and Aumann....Pages 109-115
Rethinking Rational Cooperation....Pages 117-129
Automata and Inner States for Repeated Games....Pages 131-139
Towards Bounded Rationality within Rational Expectations — Some Comments from an Economic Point of View....Pages 141-152
Macroeconomics and Behavioral Finance: A Tale of Two Disciplines....Pages 153-159
Bayesian Subjunctive Conditionals for Games and Decisions....Pages 161-172
Prediction, Bayesian Deliberation and Correlated Equilibrium....Pages 173-185
Consequentialism and Bayesian Rationality in Normal Form Games....Pages 187-196
Game Theory, Sociodynamics, and Cultural Evolution....Pages 197-210
Microscopic Foundation of Stochastic Game Dynamical Equations....Pages 211-224
Uniform Barriers and Evolutionarily Stable Sets....Pages 225-243
Equilibrium Selection Via Travelling Waves....Pages 245-259
Rational vs. Adaptive Egoism in Support Networks: How Different Micro Foundations Shape Different Macro Hypotheses....Pages 261-275
Evolutionary Ethics....Pages 277-283
A Preference-Based Theory of Well-Being and a Rule-Utilitarian Theory of Morality....Pages 285-300
Variability, Uncertainty, and the Emergence of Firms and Markets....Pages 301-314
A Game Theory of Logic — A Logic of Game Theory....Pages 315-323
Learning with Hazy Beliefs....Pages 325-335
A Game-Theoretic Model of the War in Chechnya....Pages 337-347
Information and Uncertainty: Power, Profits and Morality....Pages 349-357
„Sicher ist Sicher“....Pages 359-367
Scientific Emigration....Pages 369-378
Reflections on the Austrian Knowledge Bases....Pages 379-386
Editorial Information....Pages 387-395
Back Matter....Pages 397-402
....Pages 403-405