Ebook: Experimental Studies of Interactive Decisions

This book is about the interplay of theory and experimentation on group decision making in economics. The theories that the book subjects to experimental testing mostly come from the theory of games. The decisions investigated in the book mostly concern economic interaction like strict competition. two-person bargaining. and coalition formation. The underlying philosophy of the articles collected in this book is consistent with the opinion of a growing number of economists and psychologists that economic issues cannot be understood fully just by thinking about them. Rather. the interplay between theory and experimentation is critical for the development of economics as an observational science (Smith. 1989). Reports of laboratory experiments in decision making and economics date back more than thirty years (e.g .• Allais. 1953; Davidson. Suppes. and Siegel. 1957; Flood. 1958; Friedman. 1%3; Kalisch. Milnor. Nash. and Nering. 1954; Lieberman. 1%0; Mosteller and Nogee. 1951; Rapoport. Chammah. Dwyer. and Gyr. I %2; Siegel and Fouraker. I %0; Stone. 1958). However. only in the last ten or fifteen years has laboratory experimentation in economics started its steady transformation from an occasional curiosity into a regular means for investigating various economic phenomena and examining the role of economic institutions. Groups of researchers in the USA and abroad have used experimental methods with increasing sophistication to attack economic problems that arise in individual decision making under risk. two-person bargaining.

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Content:
Front Matter....Pages i-xiv
Optimal Policies for the Prisoner’s Dilemma....Pages 1-18
Experimental Studies of Interdependent Mixed-Motive Games....Pages 19-41
Decisions of Timing in Bipolarized Conflict Situations with Complete Information....Pages 43-64
Decisions of Timing in Conflict Situations of Incomplete Information....Pages 65-87
Decisions of Timing in Experimental Probabilistic Duels....Pages 89-118
Effects of Fixed Costs in Two-Person Sequential Bargaining....Pages 119-137
A PDP-11/45 Program for Playing N-Person Characteristic Function Games....Pages 139-146
Test of The Bargaining Set and Kernel Models in Three-Person Games....Pages 147-181
Test of the Kernel and Two Bargaining Set Models in Four- and Five-Person Games....Pages 183-209
Standards of Fairness in 4-Person Monopolistic Cooperative Games....Pages 211-233
Coalition Formation in the Triad When Two are Weak and One is Strong....Pages 235-261
The Power of a Coalition and Payoff Disbursement in Three-Person Negotiable Conflicts....Pages 263-294
Coalition Formation in a Five-Person Market Game....Pages 295-316
Relative Gain Maximization in Sequential 3-Person Characteristic Function Games....Pages 317-344
Comparison of Theories for Payoff Disbursement of Coalition Values....Pages 345-374
Assessment of Political Power in the Israeli Knesset....Pages 375-405
Dominated, Connected, and Tight Coalitions in the Israeli Knesset....Pages 407-425
Back Matter....Pages 427-437

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Content:
Front Matter....Pages i-xiv
Optimal Policies for the Prisoner’s Dilemma....Pages 1-18
Experimental Studies of Interdependent Mixed-Motive Games....Pages 19-41
Decisions of Timing in Bipolarized Conflict Situations with Complete Information....Pages 43-64
Decisions of Timing in Conflict Situations of Incomplete Information....Pages 65-87
Decisions of Timing in Experimental Probabilistic Duels....Pages 89-118
Effects of Fixed Costs in Two-Person Sequential Bargaining....Pages 119-137
A PDP-11/45 Program for Playing N-Person Characteristic Function Games....Pages 139-146
Test of The Bargaining Set and Kernel Models in Three-Person Games....Pages 147-181
Test of the Kernel and Two Bargaining Set Models in Four- and Five-Person Games....Pages 183-209
Standards of Fairness in 4-Person Monopolistic Cooperative Games....Pages 211-233
Coalition Formation in the Triad When Two are Weak and One is Strong....Pages 235-261
The Power of a Coalition and Payoff Disbursement in Three-Person Negotiable Conflicts....Pages 263-294
Coalition Formation in a Five-Person Market Game....Pages 295-316
Relative Gain Maximization in Sequential 3-Person Characteristic Function Games....Pages 317-344
Comparison of Theories for Payoff Disbursement of Coalition Values....Pages 345-374
Assessment of Political Power in the Israeli Knesset....Pages 375-405
Dominated, Connected, and Tight Coalitions in the Israeli Knesset....Pages 407-425
Back Matter....Pages 427-437
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