Ebook: Knowing and the Mystique of Logic and Rules: True Statements in Knowing and Action * Computer Modelling of Human Knowing Activity * Coherent Description as the Core of Scholarship and Science

Human knowing is examined as it emerges from classical empirical psychology, with its ramifications into language, computing, science, and scholarship. While the discussion takes empirical support from a wide range, claims for the significance of logic and rules are challenged throughout. Highlights of the discussion:

• knowing is a matter of habits or dispositions that guide the person's stream of consciousness;
• rules of language have no significance in language production and understanding, being descriptions of linguistic styles;
• statements that may be true or false enter into ordinary linguistic activity, not as elements of messages, but merely as summaries of situations, with a view to action;
• in computer programming the significance of logic, proof, and formalized description, is incidental and subject to the programmer's personality;
• analysis of computer modelling of the mental activity shows that in describing human knowing the computer is irrelevant;
• in accounting for the scholarly/scientific activity, logic and rules are impotent;
• a novel theory: scholarship and science have coherent descriptions as their core.

The discussion addresses questions that are basic to advanced applications of computers and to students of language and science.

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Human knowing is examined as it emerges from classical empirical psychology, with its ramifications into language, computing, science, and scholarship. While the discussion takes empirical support from a wide range, claims for the significance of logic and rules are challenged throughout. Highlights of the discussion:

• knowing is a matter of habits or dispositions that guide the person's stream of consciousness;
• rules of language have no significance in language production and understanding, being descriptions of linguistic styles;
• statements that may be true or false enter into ordinary linguistic activity, not as elements of messages, but merely as summaries of situations, with a view to action;
• in computer programming the significance of logic, proof, and formalized description, is incidental and subject to the programmer's personality;
• analysis of computer modelling of the mental activity shows that in describing human knowing the computer is irrelevant;
• in accounting for the scholarly/scientific activity, logic and rules are impotent;
• a novel theory: scholarship and science have coherent descriptions as their core.

The discussion addresses questions that are basic to advanced applications of computers and to students of language and science.

---

Human knowing is examined as it emerges from classical empirical psychology, with its ramifications into language, computing, science, and scholarship. While the discussion takes empirical support from a wide range, claims for the significance of logic and rules are challenged throughout. Highlights of the discussion:

• knowing is a matter of habits or dispositions that guide the person's stream of consciousness;
• rules of language have no significance in language production and understanding, being descriptions of linguistic styles;
• statements that may be true or false enter into ordinary linguistic activity, not as elements of messages, but merely as summaries of situations, with a view to action;
• in computer programming the significance of logic, proof, and formalized description, is incidental and subject to the programmer's personality;
• analysis of computer modelling of the mental activity shows that in describing human knowing the computer is irrelevant;
• in accounting for the scholarly/scientific activity, logic and rules are impotent;
• a novel theory: scholarship and science have coherent descriptions as their core.

The discussion addresses questions that are basic to advanced applications of computers and to students of language and science.
Content:
Front Matter....Pages i-xii
Front Matter....Pages 1-4
William James’s Psychology of Knowing....Pages 5-50
Bertrand Russell on Knowing....Pages 51-70
J. L. Austin on How One Knows....Pages 71-73
Gilbert Ryle on Knowing....Pages 75-86
Summary on the Psychology of Knowing....Pages 87-89
Front Matter....Pages 91-94
Rules and Regularity in Language....Pages 95-110
Rules and Regularity in Musical Composition....Pages 111-120
Language Production and Understanding....Pages 121-136
True Statements in Knowing and Action....Pages 137-160
Front Matter....Pages 161-163
Three Notions of Proof....Pages 165-169
Proof versus Formalization....Pages 171-188
Personal Style in Program Description and Understanding....Pages 189-212
Computer Modelling of Human Knowing Activity....Pages 213-226
Front Matter....Pages 227-229
The Structure of DNA: Knowing in Biological Discovery....Pages 231-252
Why the Sun Shines: Coherence and Models in Scientific Description....Pages 253-260
Aberration in Special Relativity: A Case of Chronic Scientific Confusion....Pages 261-270
The Metaphysics of Constructed Models....Pages 271-292
Logic and Psychology of the Scientific Activity....Pages 293-316
Coherent Description as the Core of Scholarship and Science....Pages 317-350
Back Matter....Pages 351-367

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Human knowing is examined as it emerges from classical empirical psychology, with its ramifications into language, computing, science, and scholarship. While the discussion takes empirical support from a wide range, claims for the significance of logic and rules are challenged throughout. Highlights of the discussion:

• knowing is a matter of habits or dispositions that guide the person's stream of consciousness;
• rules of language have no significance in language production and understanding, being descriptions of linguistic styles;
• statements that may be true or false enter into ordinary linguistic activity, not as elements of messages, but merely as summaries of situations, with a view to action;
• in computer programming the significance of logic, proof, and formalized description, is incidental and subject to the programmer's personality;
• analysis of computer modelling of the mental activity shows that in describing human knowing the computer is irrelevant;
• in accounting for the scholarly/scientific activity, logic and rules are impotent;
• a novel theory: scholarship and science have coherent descriptions as their core.

The discussion addresses questions that are basic to advanced applications of computers and to students of language and science.
Content:
Front Matter....Pages i-xii
Front Matter....Pages 1-4
William James’s Psychology of Knowing....Pages 5-50
Bertrand Russell on Knowing....Pages 51-70
J. L. Austin on How One Knows....Pages 71-73
Gilbert Ryle on Knowing....Pages 75-86
Summary on the Psychology of Knowing....Pages 87-89
Front Matter....Pages 91-94
Rules and Regularity in Language....Pages 95-110
Rules and Regularity in Musical Composition....Pages 111-120
Language Production and Understanding....Pages 121-136
True Statements in Knowing and Action....Pages 137-160
Front Matter....Pages 161-163
Three Notions of Proof....Pages 165-169
Proof versus Formalization....Pages 171-188
Personal Style in Program Description and Understanding....Pages 189-212
Computer Modelling of Human Knowing Activity....Pages 213-226
Front Matter....Pages 227-229
The Structure of DNA: Knowing in Biological Discovery....Pages 231-252
Why the Sun Shines: Coherence and Models in Scientific Description....Pages 253-260
Aberration in Special Relativity: A Case of Chronic Scientific Confusion....Pages 261-270
The Metaphysics of Constructed Models....Pages 271-292
Logic and Psychology of the Scientific Activity....Pages 293-316
Coherent Description as the Core of Scholarship and Science....Pages 317-350
Back Matter....Pages 351-367
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