Ebook: Social Choice Mechanisms
- Tags: Game Theory/Mathematical Methods, Game Theory Economics Social and Behav. Sciences
- Series: Studies in Economic Design
- Year: 2002
- Publisher: Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
- Edition: 1
- Language: English
- pdf
The theory of social choice deals with both the processes and results of col lective decision making. In this book, we explore some issues in the theory of social choice and mechanism design. We examine the premises of this theory, the axiomatic approach, and the mechanism design approach. The main questions are what is collective interest, how is it related to individuals' interests, how should one design social interactions, laws, and in stitutions? These questions are not new. Philosophers, social scientists have indeed pondered upon them for years. And, in fact, the organizational struc tures of many social institutions -courts, parliaments, committees and reg ulatory boards -often lack a sound theoretical base. This is not surprising, as it is, indeed, difficult to provide for a comprehensive formalization of the activities of such organizations. Nevertheless, there has been a definite trend towards providing clear and unambiguous rules for collective decision mak ing. These very rules constitute the body of social choice theory and its main object. The basic problem of social choice We explain here more precisely what a problem of social choice is, what approaches might be used to tackle it, and what kind of solutions it leads to. We introduce a few basic notions in preliminarily fashion and, in doing so, we stress both motivations and explanations.
Theory of social choice mechanisms is a comparatively new theory. The first results were obtained as early as the beginning of the seventies. The book contains the most important results of the theory. In two main topics the book describes what mechanisms allow equilibrium solutions at any agents` preference profiles, and what outcomes can be implemented. The answer depends on the equilibrium concept. Furthermore the four equilibrium concepts Nash equilibrium, strong Nash equilibrium, equilibrium in dominant strategies, and the core were described in detail.
Theory of social choice mechanisms is a comparatively new theory. The first results were obtained as early as the beginning of the seventies. The book contains the most important results of the theory. In two main topics the book describes what mechanisms allow equilibrium solutions at any agents` preference profiles, and what outcomes can be implemented. The answer depends on the equilibrium concept. Furthermore the four equilibrium concepts Nash equilibrium, strong Nash equilibrium, equilibrium in dominant strategies, and the core were described in detail.
Content:
Front Matter....Pages i-vi
Introduction....Pages 1-8
Basic Concepts....Pages 9-44
Nash-consistent Mechanisms....Pages 45-71
Strategy-proof Mechanisms....Pages 73-109
Cores and Stable Blockings....Pages 111-143
Strongly Consistent Mechanisms....Pages 145-181
Back Matter....Pages 183-191
Theory of social choice mechanisms is a comparatively new theory. The first results were obtained as early as the beginning of the seventies. The book contains the most important results of the theory. In two main topics the book describes what mechanisms allow equilibrium solutions at any agents` preference profiles, and what outcomes can be implemented. The answer depends on the equilibrium concept. Furthermore the four equilibrium concepts Nash equilibrium, strong Nash equilibrium, equilibrium in dominant strategies, and the core were described in detail.
Content:
Front Matter....Pages i-vi
Introduction....Pages 1-8
Basic Concepts....Pages 9-44
Nash-consistent Mechanisms....Pages 45-71
Strategy-proof Mechanisms....Pages 73-109
Cores and Stable Blockings....Pages 111-143
Strongly Consistent Mechanisms....Pages 145-181
Back Matter....Pages 183-191
....