Ebook: Understanding Strategic Interaction: Essays in Honor of Reinhard Selten

Strategic interaction occurs whenever it depends on others what one finally obtains: on markets, in firms, in politics etc. Game theorists analyse such interaction normatively, using numerous different methods. The rationalistic approach assumes perfect rationality whereas behavioral theories take into account cognitive limitations of human decision makers. In the animal kingdom one usually refers to evolutionary forces when explaining social interaction. The volume contains innovative contributions, surveys of previous work and two interviews which shed new light on these important topics of the research agenda. The contributions come from highly regarded researchers from all over the world who like to express in this way their intellectual inspiration by the Nobel-laureate Reinhard Selten.

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Strategic interaction occurs whenever it depends on others what one finally obtains: on markets, in firms, in politics etc. Game theorists analyse such interaction normatively, using numerous different methods. The rationalistic approach assumes perfect rationality whereas behavioral theories take into account cognitive limitations of human decision makers. In the animal kingdom one usually refers to evolutionary forces when explaining social interaction. The volume contains innovative contributions, surveys of previous work and two interviews which shed new light on these important topics of the research agenda. The contributions come from highly regarded researchers from all over the world who like to express in this way their intellectual inspiration by the Nobel-laureate Reinhard Selten.

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Strategic interaction occurs whenever it depends on others what one finally obtains: on markets, in firms, in politics etc. Game theorists analyse such interaction normatively, using numerous different methods. The rationalistic approach assumes perfect rationality whereas behavioral theories take into account cognitive limitations of human decision makers. In the animal kingdom one usually refers to evolutionary forces when explaining social interaction. The volume contains innovative contributions, surveys of previous work and two interviews which shed new light on these important topics of the research agenda. The contributions come from highly regarded researchers from all over the world who like to express in this way their intellectual inspiration by the Nobel-laureate Reinhard Selten.
Content:
Front Matter....Pages I-IX
Interview with Elisabeth and Reinhard Selten....Pages 1-7
On the State of the Art in Game Theory: An Interview with Robert Aumann....Pages 8-34
Working with Reinhard Selten Some Recollections on Our Joint Work 1965–88....Pages 35-38
Introduction and Survey....Pages 39-50
A Note On Imperfect Recall....Pages 51-62
Futures Market Contracting When You Don’t Know Who the Optimists Are....Pages 63-78
Games of Incomplete Information: The Inconsistent Case....Pages 79-84
Admissibility and Stability....Pages 85-99
Equilibrium Selection in Team Games....Pages 100-110
Sustainable Equilibria in Culturally Familiar Games....Pages 111-121
Evolutionary Conflict and the Design of Life....Pages 122-127
Evolutionary Selection Dynamics and Irrational Survivors....Pages 128-148
Strict and Symmetric Correlated Equilibria are the Distributions of the ESS’s of Biological Conflicts with Asymmetric Roles....Pages 149-170
Recurring Bullies, Trembling and Learning....Pages 171-184
Dumb Bugs vs. Bright Noncooperative Players: A Comparison....Pages 185-197
Communication Effort in Teams and in Games....Pages 198-216
Endogenous Agendas in Committees....Pages 217-227
The Organization of Social Cooperation: A Noncooperative Approach....Pages 228-242
Reinhard Selten Meets the Classics....Pages 243-256
Equilibrium Selection in Linguistic Games: Kial Ni (Ne) Parolas Esperanton?....Pages 257-269
Are Stable Demands Vectors in the Core of Two-Sided Markets? Some Graph-Theoretical Considerations....Pages 270-278
The Consistent Solution for Non-Atomic Games....Pages 279-285
Finite Convergence of the Core in a Piecewise Linear Market Game....Pages 286-304
Credible Threats of Secession, Partnership, and Commonwealths....Pages 305-312
Rules for Experimenting in Psychology and Economics, and Why They Differ....Pages 313-327
Reciprocity: The Behavioral Foundations of Socio-Economic Games....Pages 328-344
Adaptation of Aspiration Levels - Theory and Experiment -....Pages 345-364
A Model of Boundedly Rational Experienced Bargaining in Characteristic Function Games....Pages 365-385
Theory, Field, and Laboratory: The Continuing Dialogue....Pages 386-393
Naive Strategies in Competitive Games....Pages 394-402
Induction vs. Deterrence in the Chain Store Game: How Many Potential Entrants are Needed to Deter Entry?....Pages 403-417
Cooperation in Intergroup and Single-Group Prisoner’s Dilemma Games....Pages 418-429
On Styles of Relating to Bargaining Partners....Pages 430-443
What Makes Markets Predict Well? Evidence from the Iowa Electronic Markets....Pages 444-463
Sequencing and the Size of the Budget Experimental Evidence....Pages 464-474
Intertemporal Speculation Under Uncertain Future Demand: Experimental Results....Pages 475-493
Endowment Effect for Risky Assets....Pages 494-512
Back Matter....Pages 513-517

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Strategic interaction occurs whenever it depends on others what one finally obtains: on markets, in firms, in politics etc. Game theorists analyse such interaction normatively, using numerous different methods. The rationalistic approach assumes perfect rationality whereas behavioral theories take into account cognitive limitations of human decision makers. In the animal kingdom one usually refers to evolutionary forces when explaining social interaction. The volume contains innovative contributions, surveys of previous work and two interviews which shed new light on these important topics of the research agenda. The contributions come from highly regarded researchers from all over the world who like to express in this way their intellectual inspiration by the Nobel-laureate Reinhard Selten.
Content:
Front Matter....Pages I-IX
Interview with Elisabeth and Reinhard Selten....Pages 1-7
On the State of the Art in Game Theory: An Interview with Robert Aumann....Pages 8-34
Working with Reinhard Selten Some Recollections on Our Joint Work 1965–88....Pages 35-38
Introduction and Survey....Pages 39-50
A Note On Imperfect Recall....Pages 51-62
Futures Market Contracting When You Don’t Know Who the Optimists Are....Pages 63-78
Games of Incomplete Information: The Inconsistent Case....Pages 79-84
Admissibility and Stability....Pages 85-99
Equilibrium Selection in Team Games....Pages 100-110
Sustainable Equilibria in Culturally Familiar Games....Pages 111-121
Evolutionary Conflict and the Design of Life....Pages 122-127
Evolutionary Selection Dynamics and Irrational Survivors....Pages 128-148
Strict and Symmetric Correlated Equilibria are the Distributions of the ESS’s of Biological Conflicts with Asymmetric Roles....Pages 149-170
Recurring Bullies, Trembling and Learning....Pages 171-184
Dumb Bugs vs. Bright Noncooperative Players: A Comparison....Pages 185-197
Communication Effort in Teams and in Games....Pages 198-216
Endogenous Agendas in Committees....Pages 217-227
The Organization of Social Cooperation: A Noncooperative Approach....Pages 228-242
Reinhard Selten Meets the Classics....Pages 243-256
Equilibrium Selection in Linguistic Games: Kial Ni (Ne) Parolas Esperanton?....Pages 257-269
Are Stable Demands Vectors in the Core of Two-Sided Markets? Some Graph-Theoretical Considerations....Pages 270-278
The Consistent Solution for Non-Atomic Games....Pages 279-285
Finite Convergence of the Core in a Piecewise Linear Market Game....Pages 286-304
Credible Threats of Secession, Partnership, and Commonwealths....Pages 305-312
Rules for Experimenting in Psychology and Economics, and Why They Differ....Pages 313-327
Reciprocity: The Behavioral Foundations of Socio-Economic Games....Pages 328-344
Adaptation of Aspiration Levels - Theory and Experiment -....Pages 345-364
A Model of Boundedly Rational Experienced Bargaining in Characteristic Function Games....Pages 365-385
Theory, Field, and Laboratory: The Continuing Dialogue....Pages 386-393
Naive Strategies in Competitive Games....Pages 394-402
Induction vs. Deterrence in the Chain Store Game: How Many Potential Entrants are Needed to Deter Entry?....Pages 403-417
Cooperation in Intergroup and Single-Group Prisoner’s Dilemma Games....Pages 418-429
On Styles of Relating to Bargaining Partners....Pages 430-443
What Makes Markets Predict Well? Evidence from the Iowa Electronic Markets....Pages 444-463
Sequencing and the Size of the Budget Experimental Evidence....Pages 464-474
Intertemporal Speculation Under Uncertain Future Demand: Experimental Results....Pages 475-493
Endowment Effect for Risky Assets....Pages 494-512
Back Matter....Pages 513-517
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