Ebook: Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications: First International ICST Conference, AMMA 2009, Boston, MA, USA, May 8-9, 2009, Revised Selected Papers

This book constitutes the thoroughly refereed post-conference proceedings of the First International ICST Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications, AMMA 2009, held in Boston, MA, USA, in May 2009.

The 16 revised papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from 38 submissions. The contents range from fundamental theory on auctions and markets to empirical design and analysis of matching mechanisms, peer-to-peer-systems, and prediction markets. This includes an understanding of the economic and gametheoretic issues, the ability to design protocols and algorithms for realizing desired outcomes, and the knowledge of specific institutional details that are important in practical applications.

This volume aims at economists, computer scientists, theorists and empiricists as well as academics and practitioners.

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This book constitutes the thoroughly refereed post-conference proceedings of the First International ICST Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications, AMMA 2009, held in Boston, MA, USA, in May 2009.

The 16 revised papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from 38 submissions. The contents range from fundamental theory on auctions and markets to empirical design and analysis of matching mechanisms, peer-to-peer-systems, and prediction markets. This includes an understanding of the economic and gametheoretic issues, the ability to design protocols and algorithms for realizing desired outcomes, and the knowledge of specific institutional details that are important in practical applications.

This volume aims at economists, computer scientists, theorists and empiricists as well as academics and practitioners.

---

This book constitutes the thoroughly refereed post-conference proceedings of the First International ICST Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications, AMMA 2009, held in Boston, MA, USA, in May 2009.

The 16 revised papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from 38 submissions. The contents range from fundamental theory on auctions and markets to empirical design and analysis of matching mechanisms, peer-to-peer-systems, and prediction markets. This includes an understanding of the economic and gametheoretic issues, the ability to design protocols and algorithms for realizing desired outcomes, and the knowledge of specific institutional details that are important in practical applications.

This volume aims at economists, computer scientists, theorists and empiricists as well as academics and practitioners.

Content:
Front Matter....Pages -
Effects of Suboptimal Bidding in Combinatorial Auctions....Pages 1-2
Using Prediction Markets to Track Information Flows: Evidence from Google....Pages 3-3
A Copula Function Approach to Infer Correlation in Prediction Markets....Pages 4-12
Manipulating Scrip Systems: Sybils and Collusion....Pages 13-24
A Centralized Auction Mechanism for the Disability and Survivors Insurance in Chile....Pages 25-25
Information Feedback and Efficiency in Multiattribute Double Auctions....Pages 26-39
Impact of Misalignment of Trading Agent Strategy across Multiple Markets....Pages 40-54
Market Design for a P2P Backup System....Pages 55-57
School Choice: The Case for the Boston Mechanism....Pages 58-60
Turing Trade: A Hybrid of a Turing Test and a Prediction Market....Pages 61-73
A Market-Based Approach to Multi-factory Scheduling....Pages 74-86
Auctions with Dynamic Populations: Efficiency and Revenue Maximization....Pages 87-88
Revenue Submodularity....Pages 89-91
Fair Package Assignment....Pages 92-92
Solving Winner Determination Problems for Auctions with Economies of Scope and Scale....Pages 93-94
Running Out of Numbers: Scarcity of IP Addresses and What to Do about It....Pages 95-106
Back Matter....Pages -

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This book constitutes the thoroughly refereed post-conference proceedings of the First International ICST Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications, AMMA 2009, held in Boston, MA, USA, in May 2009.

The 16 revised papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from 38 submissions. The contents range from fundamental theory on auctions and markets to empirical design and analysis of matching mechanisms, peer-to-peer-systems, and prediction markets. This includes an understanding of the economic and gametheoretic issues, the ability to design protocols and algorithms for realizing desired outcomes, and the knowledge of specific institutional details that are important in practical applications.

This volume aims at economists, computer scientists, theorists and empiricists as well as academics and practitioners.

Content:
Front Matter....Pages -
Effects of Suboptimal Bidding in Combinatorial Auctions....Pages 1-2
Using Prediction Markets to Track Information Flows: Evidence from Google....Pages 3-3
A Copula Function Approach to Infer Correlation in Prediction Markets....Pages 4-12
Manipulating Scrip Systems: Sybils and Collusion....Pages 13-24
A Centralized Auction Mechanism for the Disability and Survivors Insurance in Chile....Pages 25-25
Information Feedback and Efficiency in Multiattribute Double Auctions....Pages 26-39
Impact of Misalignment of Trading Agent Strategy across Multiple Markets....Pages 40-54
Market Design for a P2P Backup System....Pages 55-57
School Choice: The Case for the Boston Mechanism....Pages 58-60
Turing Trade: A Hybrid of a Turing Test and a Prediction Market....Pages 61-73
A Market-Based Approach to Multi-factory Scheduling....Pages 74-86
Auctions with Dynamic Populations: Efficiency and Revenue Maximization....Pages 87-88
Revenue Submodularity....Pages 89-91
Fair Package Assignment....Pages 92-92
Solving Winner Determination Problems for Auctions with Economies of Scope and Scale....Pages 93-94
Running Out of Numbers: Scarcity of IP Addresses and What to Do about It....Pages 95-106
Back Matter....Pages -
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