Ebook: Consciousness and Intentionality: Models and Modalities of Attribution

Philosophy of mind has been one of the most active fields in philosophy for the past three decades. One of the most significant factors in the development of this discipline has been the emergence of cognitive science and the interest philosophers have taken in the empirical study of mind. Another equally important factor has been the "naturalistic tum" brought about by W. V. Quine. His proposal that normative epistemology be replaced by empirical psychology marked a radical departure from the Fregean "anti­ psychologism" and "apriorism" that had characterized much of the analytic tradition in philosophy. But while Quine's program of naturalization called the attention of philosophers to empirical psychology, his conception of psychology was inspired by an austere behaviorism which shunned the mentalism of intentional psychology in the Brentanian and phenomenological tradition. Thus, while agreeing with Brentano that the "intentional idiom" could not be reduced to that of the natural sciences, Quine argued that it is of a piece with the indeterminacy of translation. Most contributors of this col­ lection share the cognitivist stance and believe that the mind needs to be explained rather than eliminated. Three main questions are actually confronting current philosophers of mind, each addressed by one or another of the contributors to the present collection.

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The papers collected here had their origin in a conference held in Montreal, 1-3 June 1995. The conference drew together researchers of all persuasions, from Europe and North America, to discuss the philosophy of mind.
The volume is divided into four sections, each section being prefaced by a specific introduction. The first section deals mainly with the problem of consciousness in relation to intentionality. The second section's main topic is the problem of `qualia', a notion closely related to phenomenal consciousness, approached in the context of perception. The last two sections raise several problems related to what has been called `folk psychology'.
Readership: Philosophers interested in philosophy of mind, psychologists, cognitive scientists.

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The papers collected here had their origin in a conference held in Montreal, 1-3 June 1995. The conference drew together researchers of all persuasions, from Europe and North America, to discuss the philosophy of mind.
The volume is divided into four sections, each section being prefaced by a specific introduction. The first section deals mainly with the problem of consciousness in relation to intentionality. The second section's main topic is the problem of `qualia', a notion closely related to phenomenal consciousness, approached in the context of perception. The last two sections raise several problems related to what has been called `folk psychology'.
Readership: Philosophers interested in philosophy of mind, psychologists, cognitive scientists.
Content:
Front Matter....Pages i-viii
Front Matter....Pages 1-7
State Consciousness Revisited....Pages 9-32
Conscious Intentionality....Pages 33-49
Intentionality, Consciousness and the System’s Perspective....Pages 51-72
Consciousness as Valued Procedural Mode of Apprehension....Pages 73-90
Front Matter....Pages 91-94
The Colors and Shapes of Visual Experiences....Pages 95-118
Qualia and Representations....Pages 119-144
Filling-In : Visual Science and the Philosophy of Perception....Pages 145-161
Perception, Particulars and Predicates....Pages 163-194
Front Matter....Pages 195-198
Pretense in Prediction: Simulation and Understanding Minds....Pages 199-216
Pragmatic Aspects of Content Determination....Pages 217-228
On the Principle of Charity and the Sources of Indeterminacy....Pages 229-248
Davidson, Indeterminacy, and Measurement....Pages 249-265
Front Matter....Pages 267-271
Davidson on Intentional Causation....Pages 273-285
Externalism, Dedicto Beliefs, Proper Names and Reference Determination....Pages 287-309
Two Concepts of Belief....Pages 311-344
Back Matter....Pages 345-366

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The papers collected here had their origin in a conference held in Montreal, 1-3 June 1995. The conference drew together researchers of all persuasions, from Europe and North America, to discuss the philosophy of mind.
The volume is divided into four sections, each section being prefaced by a specific introduction. The first section deals mainly with the problem of consciousness in relation to intentionality. The second section's main topic is the problem of `qualia', a notion closely related to phenomenal consciousness, approached in the context of perception. The last two sections raise several problems related to what has been called `folk psychology'.
Readership: Philosophers interested in philosophy of mind, psychologists, cognitive scientists.
Content:
Front Matter....Pages i-viii
Front Matter....Pages 1-7
State Consciousness Revisited....Pages 9-32
Conscious Intentionality....Pages 33-49
Intentionality, Consciousness and the System’s Perspective....Pages 51-72
Consciousness as Valued Procedural Mode of Apprehension....Pages 73-90
Front Matter....Pages 91-94
The Colors and Shapes of Visual Experiences....Pages 95-118
Qualia and Representations....Pages 119-144
Filling-In : Visual Science and the Philosophy of Perception....Pages 145-161
Perception, Particulars and Predicates....Pages 163-194
Front Matter....Pages 195-198
Pretense in Prediction: Simulation and Understanding Minds....Pages 199-216
Pragmatic Aspects of Content Determination....Pages 217-228
On the Principle of Charity and the Sources of Indeterminacy....Pages 229-248
Davidson, Indeterminacy, and Measurement....Pages 249-265
Front Matter....Pages 267-271
Davidson on Intentional Causation....Pages 273-285
Externalism, Dedicto Beliefs, Proper Names and Reference Determination....Pages 287-309
Two Concepts of Belief....Pages 311-344
Back Matter....Pages 345-366
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