Ebook: Human Thought

Conscious experience and thought content are customarily treated as distinct problems. This book argues that they are not. Part One develops a chastened empiricist theory of content, which cedes to experience a crucial role in rooting the contents of thoughts, but deploys an expanded conception of experience and of the ways in which contents may be rooted in experience. Part Two shows how, were the world as we experience it to be, our neurophysiology would be sufficient to constitute capacities for the range of intuitive thoughts recognized by Part One. Part Three argues that physics has shown that our experience is not veridical, and that this implies that no completely plausible account of how we have thoughts is comprehensible by humans. Yet this leaves thoughts not especially suspect, because such considerations also imply that all positive and contingent human conceptions of anything are false.

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Conscious experience and thought content are customarily treated as distinct problems. This book argues that they are not. Part One develops a chastened empiricist theory of content, which cedes to experience a crucial role in rooting the contents of thoughts, but deploys an expanded conception of experience and of the ways in which contents may be rooted in experience. Part Two shows how, were the world as we experience it to be, our neurophysiology would be sufficient to constitute capacities for the range of intuitive thoughts recognized by Part One. Part Three argues that physics has shown that our experience is not veridical, and that this implies that no completely plausible account of how we have thoughts is comprehensible by humans. Yet this leaves thoughts not especially suspect, because such considerations also imply that all positive and contingent human conceptions of anything are false.

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Conscious experience and thought content are customarily treated as distinct problems. This book argues that they are not. Part One develops a chastened empiricist theory of content, which cedes to experience a crucial role in rooting the contents of thoughts, but deploys an expanded conception of experience and of the ways in which contents may be rooted in experience. Part Two shows how, were the world as we experience it to be, our neurophysiology would be sufficient to constitute capacities for the range of intuitive thoughts recognized by Part One. Part Three argues that physics has shown that our experience is not veridical, and that this implies that no completely plausible account of how we have thoughts is comprehensible by humans. Yet this leaves thoughts not especially suspect, because such considerations also imply that all positive and contingent human conceptions of anything are false.
Content:
Front Matter....Pages i-ix
Introduction....Pages 1-22
Front Matter....Pages 23-23
From Content to Representational Content....Pages 25-50
From Representational Content to Basic Content....Pages 51-75
Basic Content and Experience....Pages 77-95
Microevents....Pages 97-123
Phenomenal Elements....Pages 125-141
Causal Elements....Pages 143-165
Front Matter....Pages 167-167
Thoughts....Pages 169-200
Thought Skepticism....Pages 201-228
Words and Meaning....Pages 229-255
Resources....Pages 257-277
Experience and Quasi-Experience....Pages 279-301
Thought Beyond Experience....Pages 303-326
Front Matter....Pages 327-327
Phenomenal Objects....Pages 329-347
Mere Phenomenal Experience....Pages 349-367
Causal Experience....Pages 369-387
Relativity and Causal Experience....Pages 389-405
Classical Experience and Quantum Mechanics....Pages 407-446
Conclusion....Pages 447-474
Back Matter....Pages 475-481

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Conscious experience and thought content are customarily treated as distinct problems. This book argues that they are not. Part One develops a chastened empiricist theory of content, which cedes to experience a crucial role in rooting the contents of thoughts, but deploys an expanded conception of experience and of the ways in which contents may be rooted in experience. Part Two shows how, were the world as we experience it to be, our neurophysiology would be sufficient to constitute capacities for the range of intuitive thoughts recognized by Part One. Part Three argues that physics has shown that our experience is not veridical, and that this implies that no completely plausible account of how we have thoughts is comprehensible by humans. Yet this leaves thoughts not especially suspect, because such considerations also imply that all positive and contingent human conceptions of anything are false.
Content:
Front Matter....Pages i-ix
Introduction....Pages 1-22
Front Matter....Pages 23-23
From Content to Representational Content....Pages 25-50
From Representational Content to Basic Content....Pages 51-75
Basic Content and Experience....Pages 77-95
Microevents....Pages 97-123
Phenomenal Elements....Pages 125-141
Causal Elements....Pages 143-165
Front Matter....Pages 167-167
Thoughts....Pages 169-200
Thought Skepticism....Pages 201-228
Words and Meaning....Pages 229-255
Resources....Pages 257-277
Experience and Quasi-Experience....Pages 279-301
Thought Beyond Experience....Pages 303-326
Front Matter....Pages 327-327
Phenomenal Objects....Pages 329-347
Mere Phenomenal Experience....Pages 349-367
Causal Experience....Pages 369-387
Relativity and Causal Experience....Pages 389-405
Classical Experience and Quantum Mechanics....Pages 407-446
Conclusion....Pages 447-474
Back Matter....Pages 475-481
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