Ebook: Cooperation: Game-Theoretic Approaches

Issues relating to the emergence, persistence, and stability of cooperation among social agents of every type are widely recognized to be of paramount importance. They are also analytically difficult and intellectually challenging. This book, arising from a NATO Advanced Study Institute held at SUNY in 1994, is an up-to-date presentation of the contribution of game theory to the subject. The contributors are leading specialists who focus on the problem from the many different angles of game theory, including axiomatic bargaining theory, the Nash program of non-cooperative foundations, game with complete information, repeated and sequential games, bounded rationality methods, evolutionary theory, experimental approaches, and others. Together they offer significant progress in understanding cooperation.

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Issues relating to the emergence, persistence, and stability of cooperation among social agents of every type are widely recognized to be of paramount importance. They are also analytically difficult and intellectually challenging. This book, arising from a NATO Advanced Study Institute held at SUNY in 1994, is an up-to-date presentation of the contribution of game theory to the subject. The contributors are leading specialists who focus on the problem from the many different angles of game theory, including axiomatic bargaining theory, the Nash program of non-cooperative foundations, game with complete information, repeated and sequential games, bounded rationality methods, evolutionary theory, experimental approaches, and others. Together they offer significant progress in understanding cooperation.

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Issues relating to the emergence, persistence, and stability of cooperation among social agents of every type are widely recognized to be of paramount importance. They are also analytically difficult and intellectually challenging. This book, arising from a NATO Advanced Study Institute held at SUNY in 1994, is an up-to-date presentation of the contribution of game theory to the subject. The contributors are leading specialists who focus on the problem from the many different angles of game theory, including axiomatic bargaining theory, the Nash program of non-cooperative foundations, game with complete information, repeated and sequential games, bounded rationality methods, evolutionary theory, experimental approaches, and others. Together they offer significant progress in understanding cooperation.
Content:
Front Matter....Pages I-VIII
Introduction....Pages 1-3
Introductory Remarks....Pages 5-6
Front Matter....Pages 7-7
Cooperative Theory of Bargaining I: Classical....Pages 9-24
Cooperative Theory of Bargaining II: Modern Development....Pages 25-33
Classical Cooperative Theory I: Core-Like Concepts....Pages 35-42
Classical Cooperative Theory II: Value-Like Concepts....Pages 43-49
Cooperative Theory with Incomplete Information....Pages 51-65
Front Matter....Pages 67-67
Bargaining Games....Pages 69-90
Two Lectures on Implementation Under Complete Information: General Results and the Core....Pages 91-113
Implementation Theory with Incomplete Information....Pages 115-126
Coalitional Non-Cooperative Approaches to Cooperation....Pages 127-141
Situation Approach to Cooperation....Pages 143-166
Front Matter....Pages 167-167
Cooperation Through Repetition: Complete Information....Pages 169-198
Communication, Correlation and Cooperation....Pages 199-218
Rationality and Bounded Rationality....Pages 219-231
Cooperation, Repetition, and Automata....Pages 233-255
Learning in Games: Fictitious Play Dynamics....Pages 257-273
Evolution and Games: Replicator Dynamics....Pages 275-285
Front Matter....Pages 287-287
Descriptive Approaches to Cooperation....Pages 289-328
Back Matter....Pages 329-335

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Issues relating to the emergence, persistence, and stability of cooperation among social agents of every type are widely recognized to be of paramount importance. They are also analytically difficult and intellectually challenging. This book, arising from a NATO Advanced Study Institute held at SUNY in 1994, is an up-to-date presentation of the contribution of game theory to the subject. The contributors are leading specialists who focus on the problem from the many different angles of game theory, including axiomatic bargaining theory, the Nash program of non-cooperative foundations, game with complete information, repeated and sequential games, bounded rationality methods, evolutionary theory, experimental approaches, and others. Together they offer significant progress in understanding cooperation.
Content:
Front Matter....Pages I-VIII
Introduction....Pages 1-3
Introductory Remarks....Pages 5-6
Front Matter....Pages 7-7
Cooperative Theory of Bargaining I: Classical....Pages 9-24
Cooperative Theory of Bargaining II: Modern Development....Pages 25-33
Classical Cooperative Theory I: Core-Like Concepts....Pages 35-42
Classical Cooperative Theory II: Value-Like Concepts....Pages 43-49
Cooperative Theory with Incomplete Information....Pages 51-65
Front Matter....Pages 67-67
Bargaining Games....Pages 69-90
Two Lectures on Implementation Under Complete Information: General Results and the Core....Pages 91-113
Implementation Theory with Incomplete Information....Pages 115-126
Coalitional Non-Cooperative Approaches to Cooperation....Pages 127-141
Situation Approach to Cooperation....Pages 143-166
Front Matter....Pages 167-167
Cooperation Through Repetition: Complete Information....Pages 169-198
Communication, Correlation and Cooperation....Pages 199-218
Rationality and Bounded Rationality....Pages 219-231
Cooperation, Repetition, and Automata....Pages 233-255
Learning in Games: Fictitious Play Dynamics....Pages 257-273
Evolution and Games: Replicator Dynamics....Pages 275-285
Front Matter....Pages 287-287
Descriptive Approaches to Cooperation....Pages 289-328
Back Matter....Pages 329-335
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