Ebook: Power Indices and Coalition Formation

In recent years, publications on power indices and coalition formation have multiplied. Obviously, the application of these concepts to political institutions, more specifically, to the analysis of the European Union and, as it seems, the election of the President of the United States is getting more and more popular. There are, however, also new theoretical instruments and perspectives that support these applications: First of all, the probabilistic model of coalition formation has to be mentioned which is made operational by the multilinear extension of the characteristic function form of coalition games. This instrument triggered off a reinterpretation of existing power indices and the formulation of new indices. This development is accompanied by an intensive discussion of the concept of power in general - what do we measure when we apply power measures? - and the properties that an adequate measure of power has to satisfy. Various concepts of monotonicity were proposed as litmus test. The discussion shows that the underlying theories of coalition formation play a decisive role.
New results will be discussed in this volume. Its contributions put flesh and blood on the theoretical innovations and their applications that led to a growing interest in power indices and coalition formation.

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In recent years, publications on power indices and coalition formation have multiplied. Obviously, the application of these concepts to political institutions, more specifically, to the analysis of the European Union and, as it seems, the election of the President of the United States is getting more and more popular. There are, however, also new theoretical instruments and perspectives that support these applications: First of all, the probabilistic model of coalition formation has to be mentioned which is made operational by the multilinear extension of the characteristic function form of coalition games. This instrument triggered off a reinterpretation of existing power indices and the formulation of new indices. This development is accompanied by an intensive discussion of the concept of power in general - what do we measure when we apply power measures? - and the properties that an adequate measure of power has to satisfy. Various concepts of monotonicity were proposed as litmus test. The discussion shows that the underlying theories of coalition formation play a decisive role.
New results will be discussed in this volume. Its contributions put flesh and blood on the theoretical innovations and their applications that led to a growing interest in power indices and coalition formation.

---

In recent years, publications on power indices and coalition formation have multiplied. Obviously, the application of these concepts to political institutions, more specifically, to the analysis of the European Union and, as it seems, the election of the President of the United States is getting more and more popular. There are, however, also new theoretical instruments and perspectives that support these applications: First of all, the probabilistic model of coalition formation has to be mentioned which is made operational by the multilinear extension of the characteristic function form of coalition games. This instrument triggered off a reinterpretation of existing power indices and the formulation of new indices. This development is accompanied by an intensive discussion of the concept of power in general - what do we measure when we apply power measures? - and the properties that an adequate measure of power has to satisfy. Various concepts of monotonicity were proposed as litmus test. The discussion shows that the underlying theories of coalition formation play a decisive role.
New results will be discussed in this volume. Its contributions put flesh and blood on the theoretical innovations and their applications that led to a growing interest in power indices and coalition formation.
Content:
Front Matter....Pages i-vi
Why Power Indices and Coalition Formation?....Pages 1-13
An Average Value Function for Cooperative Games....Pages 15-27
Extended Probabilistic Characterization of Power Indices....Pages 29-43
Axiomatics of Level Structure Values....Pages 45-62
Values for Multialternative Games and Multilinear Extensions....Pages 63-86
Models and Reality: The Curious Case of the Absent Abstention....Pages 87-103
Global Monotonicity of Values of Cooperative Games: An Argument Supporting the Explanatory Power of Shapley’s Approach....Pages 105-125
On the Probabilistic Relationship Between the Public Good Index and the Normalized Banzhaf Index....Pages 127-142
A Note on the Holler-Packel Axiomatization of the Public Good Index (PGI)....Pages 143-151
Power, Cooperation Indices and Coalition Structures....Pages 153-173
Equal Treatment for Both Sides of Assignment Games in the Modified Least Core....Pages 175-202
On Small Coalitions, Hierarchic Decision Making and Collective Competence....Pages 203-214
An Axiomatic Approach to Probabilistic Efficient Values for Cooperative Games....Pages 215-229
Set Games....Pages 231-251
Voting Power in a Sequence of Cooperative Games:The Case of EU Procedures....Pages 253-271
Decisiveness and Inclusiveness: Two Aspects of the Intergovernmental Choice of European Voting Rules....Pages 273-290
Calculus of Consent in the EU Council of Ministers....Pages 291-313
Coalition Formation and Voting in the Council of the European Union....Pages 315-340
Voting Power in the European Central Bank....Pages 341-351
Power Indices and the Design of Electoral/Constitutional Systems....Pages 353-362
Back Matter....Pages 371-386
Implementing Democracy in Indirect Voting Processes: the Knesset Case....Pages 363-369

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In recent years, publications on power indices and coalition formation have multiplied. Obviously, the application of these concepts to political institutions, more specifically, to the analysis of the European Union and, as it seems, the election of the President of the United States is getting more and more popular. There are, however, also new theoretical instruments and perspectives that support these applications: First of all, the probabilistic model of coalition formation has to be mentioned which is made operational by the multilinear extension of the characteristic function form of coalition games. This instrument triggered off a reinterpretation of existing power indices and the formulation of new indices. This development is accompanied by an intensive discussion of the concept of power in general - what do we measure when we apply power measures? - and the properties that an adequate measure of power has to satisfy. Various concepts of monotonicity were proposed as litmus test. The discussion shows that the underlying theories of coalition formation play a decisive role.
New results will be discussed in this volume. Its contributions put flesh and blood on the theoretical innovations and their applications that led to a growing interest in power indices and coalition formation.
Content:
Front Matter....Pages i-vi
Why Power Indices and Coalition Formation?....Pages 1-13
An Average Value Function for Cooperative Games....Pages 15-27
Extended Probabilistic Characterization of Power Indices....Pages 29-43
Axiomatics of Level Structure Values....Pages 45-62
Values for Multialternative Games and Multilinear Extensions....Pages 63-86
Models and Reality: The Curious Case of the Absent Abstention....Pages 87-103
Global Monotonicity of Values of Cooperative Games: An Argument Supporting the Explanatory Power of Shapley’s Approach....Pages 105-125
On the Probabilistic Relationship Between the Public Good Index and the Normalized Banzhaf Index....Pages 127-142
A Note on the Holler-Packel Axiomatization of the Public Good Index (PGI)....Pages 143-151
Power, Cooperation Indices and Coalition Structures....Pages 153-173
Equal Treatment for Both Sides of Assignment Games in the Modified Least Core....Pages 175-202
On Small Coalitions, Hierarchic Decision Making and Collective Competence....Pages 203-214
An Axiomatic Approach to Probabilistic Efficient Values for Cooperative Games....Pages 215-229
Set Games....Pages 231-251
Voting Power in a Sequence of Cooperative Games:The Case of EU Procedures....Pages 253-271
Decisiveness and Inclusiveness: Two Aspects of the Intergovernmental Choice of European Voting Rules....Pages 273-290
Calculus of Consent in the EU Council of Ministers....Pages 291-313
Coalition Formation and Voting in the Council of the European Union....Pages 315-340
Voting Power in the European Central Bank....Pages 341-351
Power Indices and the Design of Electoral/Constitutional Systems....Pages 353-362
Back Matter....Pages 371-386
Implementing Democracy in Indirect Voting Processes: the Knesset Case....Pages 363-369
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