Ebook: „Annähernde Parität" der Streitkräfte in Europa? Eine kritische Analyse des östlichen Streitkräftevergleiches

In Maschinenschrift.
On 30 January 1989, the Warsaw Pact for the first time presented
its own comprehensive force comparison for Europe. The following
report will examine this presentation in light of. the
force comparison published by NATO in November 1988. Taking
into account the respective criteria employed in counting, the
data used by the Warsaw Pact will be checked critically for comprehensibility
and plausibility, to clarify as far as possible
the divergences from the data used for the West's comparison.
The inclusion of the naval forces in "Europe and adjacent water
areas" in the East's comparison and the various treatments of
stockpiled weapons are taken into consideration.
The results may be summarized as follows:
1. After an adjustment for the naval forces, an evaluation of
the data, in absolute figures, of the East's comparison of
the personnel strengths of the land and air forces in Europe
indicates a slight Warsaw Pact superiority: 3.2 million to 3.0
million. Furthermore, the East's comparison establishes subcategories
based on the organizational structure of the Soviet
armed forces. The data on the personnel strength of NATO forces
are not comprehensible and can therefore be manipulated. The
West's comparison only considers land forces, arriving at a ratio
of 3.1 million to 2.2 million in favour of the Warsaw Pact.
2. As regards the number of tanks, the East's comparison sees
the Warsaw Pact enjoying an advantage of 1.9 to 1; the
West's comparison, however, finds a far greater Eastern superiority,
namely 3.1 to 1. This considerable difference is explained
- although only in part - by the extension of the
"tank" category in the East's comparison to include, for example,
lighter tanks and amphibious tanks, systems with a far lower
combat potential.
3. "Infantry Fighting Vehicles and Armoured Personnel
Carriers" in the East's comparison are put together in a
collective category that is not further specified, whereas the
West's comparison considers mechanized infantry combat vehicles
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an "other armoured vehicles" separately. The East's comparison
results in a ratio of 1.5 to 1 in favour of the Warsaw Pact,
whereas adding the two separate data groups of the West's comparison
results in a quantitative advantage of 2.4 to 1. If, on
the other hand, one only considers the potential combat performance
of comparable, original mechanized infantry combat vehicles,
the West's comparison arrives at a relative strength of
as much as 5.4 to 1 in favour of the eastern alliance.
4. In terms of artillery systems, the East's comparison calculates
a Warsaw Pact superiority of 1.3 to 1; the West's comparison,
however, figures 3 to 1. Here the difference in the
estimated extent of the East's superiority results primarily
from the lower thresholds for caliber size considered in the
East's comparison, which attributes lighter artillery undue importance
.
5. Helicopters are placed in a rather broad category in both
force comparisons, whereby powerful combat and anti-tank
helicopters are not clearly differentiated from helicopters
with support and transport tasks. Furthermore, the East's comparison
also includes naval helicopters in this category. While
the East's comparison appears to document a superficial NATO
superiority, a correction of this category reveals a slight advantage
of the Warsaw Pact here as well. In the West's comparison,
the Warsaw Pact's superiority in helicopters is 1.9 to 1.
Categorized according to currently armed helicopters belonging
to land forces, the Warsaw Pact is seen to have an advantage of
1.4 to 1.
6. In terms of anti-tank weapons, the East's comparison only
counts anti-tank missile (ATM) systems, calculating a NATO
superiority of 1.6 to 1. The West's comparison also accounts
for anti-tank guns and secondary anti-tank systems, giving the
Eastern alliance an advantage of 2.4 to 1.
7. In terms of combat aircraft, the East's comparison - after
an adjustment taking sea-based aircraft into account - arrives
at an Eastern superiority of 1.3 to 1. Here the West's
comparison calculates the Eastern advantage to be 2.1 to 1. The
remaining discrepancy results primarily from the fact that the
East's comparison leaves out the aircraft of the Soviet air armies,
adding otherwise unspecified "combat support aircraft" to
the NATO side alone. By using subcategories, the East's comparison
creates a dubious subdivision into offensive and defensive
combat aircraft.
8. In terms of "tactical missile launch systems", modern versions
of which can be mounted as "dual capable systems"
with either conventional or chemical - alongside nuclear - war
heads, the Eastern alliance has a superiority of 11.8 to 1 or,
in absolute figures, of 1,608 to 136 systems, according to its
own calcuations.
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9. "Large surface ships" and submarines are listed in separate
categories in the East's comparison. Whereas a marginal superiority
is found for the East's submarines, NATO is seen to
have a 5 to 1 advantage in ships in "Europe and adjacent water
areas". Here, the exclusion of the Eastern alliance's superior
naval potential in the peripheral seas is problematical.
10. The East's comparison, unlike the West's, fails to consider
land-based air defence systems and armoured vehicle launched
bridges. In both cases, the Warsaw Pact maintains a sizeable
advantage. To determine the number of divisions and independent
brigades of combat and artillery troops, the West's comparison
calculates an Eastern superiority of 2.2 to 1 overall, taking
account of all divisions with an active personnel corps of over
5 percent.
11. The general approach of the East's force comparison seems
to involve differentiating between individual categories
whenever the Warsaw Pact appears disadvantaged, mostly in the
case of the more powerful and offensive systems. Eastern superiority
in such weapon areas, on the other hand, remains concealed
behind expanded categories.
12. From the perspective of the West, the most remarkable
aspect of the East's force comparison lies in the mere fact
of its publication. From the perspective of the East, the publication
would appear important as corroboration of the thesis of
allegedly existent overall "rough parity" in the correlation of
military power in Europe. In this context, the force comparison
is intended to serve as indirect basic argumentational support
for the East's positions on arms control, even outside negotiations.