Ebook: Paradoks i zbawienie. Antropologia mistyczna Mistrza Eckharta i Jana od Krzyża

‘Paradox and Salvation. The Mystical Anthropology of Meister Eckhart and John of the Cross’, which is a philosophical book, consists of three parts: Part I is dedicated to Meister Eckhart’s anthropology, Part II, John’s anthropology and Part III brings a trial of interpretation of both anthropologies. The term ‘mystical anthropology’ refers to the description of the nature and transformation of man aiming at the mystical union with God.
One of the main problems dealt with in the book are the contradictions that are so frequent in the reflection of both thinkers. The aim of the book is therefore to shed some light on the nature of these contradictions and propose some satisfactory explanations of them.
When we reflect upon Eckhart’s thought, we can see these contradictions in his ideas of God. There is in him not one idea of God except that he says that God is One. He assumes, in fact, at least three concepts of God: a personal one, an impersonal one and what may be called a ‘nihilistic’ concept of God. In the personal concept he maintains that God is a person, divine attributes are a part of him and he is conceived of as the Father giving birth to the Son. In the impersonal concept of God, Eckhart suggests that the One is the source of the divine Trinity and that divine attributes are not a part of the One. Both in the personal and impersonal concept he points out the divine unknowability, but we can in no way regard this part of his theology as apophatic. In the ‘nihilistic’ concept of God, however, Eckhart regards him as totally unknowable; the only word that can be used to describe God is ‘nothing’.
In accordance with thomistic hylemorphism, Eckhart contends that man is the unity of body and soul but his dominant tendency is to regard man as a soul enslaved by the prison of body. He is similarly not univocal about the idea of the origin of the soul. In some statements he says that God gives birth to the soul, in others that it is created by him. There is not one opinion on the status of the soul vis-á-vis the angels. Sometimes he regards the human soul to be superior to the angels and sometimes it is the angels who are said to be superior. Nor can one find in Eckhart an unambiguous opinion about the sources of human cognition; genetic empiricism and nativism are declared independently by him in different fragments of his writings. Eckhart has no singular opinion on the status of reason and will. Most often he says reason is superior to will but he also sometimes asserts that will is superior to reason or that both faculties are equal. The most original concept of Eckhart’s anthropology, the concept of ‘spark of the soul’, signifies the highest element in human reality, consisting of, in fact, three independent ideas. (The term ‘spark of the soul’ is the term I use in the book, but it should be noted that in some context it is also called ‘ground of the soul’.) What is important is the fact that Eckhart uses all of them apparently without mentioning differences between them. The most original is the concept of the spark of the soul conceived of as an uncreated being, deeply hidden and not easily available to ordinary consciousness. He also calls the human faculty of reason a spark of the soul. Finally, he uses the term ‘spark of the soul’ to denote the divine light in the soul; essentially different from any element that is human, it leads one to God in general and to the mystical union in particular. When we look deeper into the idea of spark of the soul understood as an uncreated reality, we can further distinguish two other ideas that are part of it: one signifies a human participant of Trinitarian life and the other the unknowable One that is superior to God understood in a personal way.
The distinction between these various ideas of the spark of the soul in Eckhart is relevant for proper understanding of his idea of mystical union. There are in fact two separate ideas of the mystical union: the birth of God in the soul and the breakthrough. The birth of God in the soul is connected with the idea of the spark as an uncreated being in that the birth of God the Son eternally takes place in that spark and the lower, created parts of the soul are to join this Trinitarian life. Joining it means accomplishment of the deepest longing of the soul and achieving the apex of happiness, knowledge and power. The breakthrough differs from this concept of the unio mystica quite significantly. Whereas the birth of God in the soul implies the Trinitarian, i.e., a personal idea of God, the breakthrough assumes overcoming the personality of God and aiming at gotheit, that is, God that is conceived of impersonally. The idea of the spark of the soul as an uncreated participant of Trinitarian life is no longer relevant there. Relevant, however, is the idea of the spark conceived of as the active faculty of reason. It is this reason that is able to overcome the personality of God that in fact cannot satisfy it. One cannot accept the idea that the breakthrough is the first stage of the birth of God in the soul or the stage that follows it because Eckhart never shows any link between the two. Also, he represents the birth of God as the perfect fulfillment of the desire of the human heart, so it would be hardly appropriate to say that at a certain moment the soul gets dissatisfied with it and starts looking for other sorts of mystical self-accomplishment.
In order to achieve both the birth of God or the breakthrough, one needs to undergo the process of detachment (abgescheidenheit). It involves the self-overcoming that in fact is so total that it resembles the stoic idea of apatheia. It should be remarked that whereas morality is the indispensable condition of the birth of God, it does not seem to be a condition of the breakthrough. The detachment involves negation of the conceptual thinking, but it must be stated that while in the breakthrough the denial of concepts is complete and total, it is not the case for the birth of God in the soul since in it the soul is said to contemplate the Trinitarian life and God’s attributes, which would be impossible without any form of conceptuality.
There are important discrepancies in the teaching of John of the Cross. We can see them first in his theological views that are both positive and negative. Similar to Eckhart, he does not distinguish between knowability of God’s manifestations and the unknowability of his essence. Both mention in some statements that God is completely unknowable and in others, inconsistently, they describe God’s attributes or his attitude to particular forms of human conduct. In John’s reflection on the ontological structure of the human being we can observe the same ambiguities as in Eckhart. On the one hand John regards man to be the unity of body and soul, on the other his dominant tendency is to regard man in a platonic way as a soul whose main enemy is the body. We can sometimes find clashes between these two views even in the same statements. The dominant epistemological concept of John is thomistic genetic empiricism. Although he never explicitly declares nativism, one can perceive in some of his remarks his departure from the thomistic concept when he seems to assume that the way to the unio mystica is in fact the Augustinian return to the self’s interiority (but in his main work the Ascent of Mount Carmel, for example, only the genetic empiricism is propounded and there is no insistence on returning to one’s self). The equivalent of Eckhart’s idea of spark of the soul (conceived as an uncreated, hidden sphere in the soul) is John’s idea of the substance of the soul that may be described as the deepest centre of the soul. The difference is that John never declares it uncreated. The teaching of John is focused particularly on the dark night of the soul in which the soul is supposed to restrain all its activities: sensual and spiritual, intellectual and volitional. Generally speaking, the dark night of the soul is similar to Eckhart’s idea of detachment. Also John of the Cross regards self-overcoming, understood in the same way as the stoic apatheia, as the highest virtue of man aspiring to the mystical union. John’s dark night of the soul differs from Eckhart’s detachment, however, in that the night assumes lack of any activity, whereas moral activity is regarded to be both a condition and a result of the detachment; Eckhart also says in some rare statesments, and ton without contradictions, that labour activity typical of lay people is not contrary to the mystical union.
Both thinkers acknowledge that the final act of the unio mystica is the work of God’s grace alone, but one of the most interesting elements in their teachings is their view that the soul through its self-denial can force God to descend to it. This contradiction is extensively described and discussed in this book with reference to opinions of such scholars as André Bord, Niklaus Largier and Jean Orcibal, who deny there is any contradiction here. I try to show in the book that although John describes the dark night of the soul as the total restraining of all human activities, we can see in different parts of his work that he inconsistently accepts more or less implicite such human activities as constant aspiration to achieving the mystical union, aspiration to having (all, God, etc.), acting on motivation to get spiritual pleasure. Also, with respect to the cognitive aspect of the dark of the soul, there is a clear reaffirmation of human abilities to know: man can understand the meaning of Gospel (as in St. Paul and apostles, for example), God’s signs (as in the story of God’s speaking to Jethro and Moses) or the nature and the acts of God in a clear-cut positive theology (as mentioned above). Also, although the body is basically negated in John’s teaching, its role in the mystical union is reaffirmed through what can be called religious sublimation of the desire. It must be emphasized that John had contradictory views on when actually the mystical union can take place. In some statements he says that the union can take place in this lifetime, whereas in others he maintains it is achievable only in heaven’s glory.
In Part III of the book the interpretation of mystical anthropology of both authors is presented. One of the main purposes of this interpretation is to explain the contradictions that have been found in the analysis of their thought. The point of the interpretation presented in this book is that their reflection seems to be governed by the mystical desire of power. ‘Power’ here refers to a quality of things that on the one hand are dynamic, able to produce effects and on the other hand are the objects of human fascination or, in more extreme cases, of deification. Power that is important in life is always loved. Following the broad definition of salvation put forth by the Dutch phenomenologist Gerardus van der Leeuw as an act of coming into possession of power, we can say that the desire of power is in fact a desire of salvation. This desire does not contradict looking for truth or love; rather it assumes it. The greatest power Eckhart and John of the Cross are looking for is God, of course, but in order to get to this power the mystics have to wander through countless powers of the created being in search of powers that will link them efficiently to God. This search seems to constitute the core of their anthropology tkat is totally directed towards God. Now there are two sorts of power. One sort of power deals directly with the spontaneous affirmation of dynamic phenomena of the natural world: material, physical, emotional, as well as intellectual. The other sort of power comes from overcoming this affirmation and the powers affirmed in this way. The latter power is very well known in the history of religions and philosophy and the most spectacular example of it is tapas in Hinduism that is even said to be able to dominate gods themselves. Also, the philosopher of the will to power, Friedrich Nietzsche, declares the power of Selbstüberwindung to be one of the most important and his significant idea of the overman rests completely on the most extreme development of that power. The glorification of that power can be observed, I think, in Eckhart’s and John’s apotheosis of apatheia-like self-overcoming; I maintain in fact this apotheosis to be responsible for those statements in which they say that the perfect self-denial is able to force God to descend to the human soul. The crucial element of the interpretation presented in this part of the book is what may be called the dialectic of the affirmation of power and its overcoming. This dialectic is crucial because, in my assessment, it is a key to understanding Eckhart’s and John’s contradictions. I have had the opportunity to prove the existence of such a dialectic in Nietzsche’s thought in my book Friedrich Nietzsche as a Renovator of Primitive Mentality (Friedrich Nietzsche jako odnowiciel umysłowości pierwotnej. Analiza w kontekście fenomenologii religii Gerardusa van der Leeuwa, Universitas, Cracow 2000). The dialectic of the affirmation of power and its overcoming can be realized when we notice that whenever we overcome a thing, we do it just because it is somehow a powerful thing; if it were not powerful, there would be no need to overcome it. We can say that we can obtain the power of self-overcoming only when we overcome some power in us. What is important is the fact that the latter – just because it is a power and just because it is loved as such – could have been affirmed in the past (i.e. before it got the object of self-overcoming) and can be reaffirmed again in the future (after it is overcome). Therefore, one would have to admit that in some longer space of time the self-overcoming man can, or perhaps even has to, collect and expose both the powers of self-overcoming and the powers of what is overcome. It must be noted that as the fascination for power is not merely an intellectual process and as reaffirmed powers can present themselves under different names, the tendency to collect these incoherent powers in this way is not completely conscious for those who participate in it.
Now if we transpose this dialectic of power into the level of the written text, i. e., concepts and logic, we can realize why it culminates in logical contradictions. Words and concepts do not only represent sheer reality, but also represent the powers of reality. When in the realm of the desire of power we accept a power of a, then in the realm of logic and text we affirm a view A or a concept A that describes or is somehow connected to this power; when in the realm of the desire of power we overcome the power of a accepting the power of self-overcoming non-a, then in the realm of logic and text we refute A and affirm a view or a concept non-A. It follows that the dialectic of the affirmation of power and its overcoming has to lead to textual and conceptual contradictions. In Eckhart’s and John’s anthropological thinking we can observe four relatively independent structures that are governed by this dialectic: an integral structure, a structure of the soul, a structure of the depth of the soul and a structure of the overcoming of the depth of the soul. In the integral structure, in which the value of the whole creation is admitted, both mystics maintain man to be the unity of body and soul; God is the Creator and the material world in some ways is similar to its Creator. In the structure of the soul, in which the value of the matter is no longer admitted, they think man is basically a soul and the efficiency of its abilities is underscored; in the framework of this structure Eckhart regard the spark of the soul to be the faculty of reason in the fullest development of its forces; the material world carries no resemblance to God, and God, as John puts it, creates the world ‘in passing and in haste’ (Spiritual Canticle 5.3). In the structure of the depth of the soul all the perceivable powers of the body and the soul are denied and the emphasis is put on the value of the hidden element in the soul in which the unio mystica takes place; in the framework of this structure Eckhart regards the spark of the soul as an uncreated being, a participant of the Trinitarian life and the mystical union is conceived of as the birth of God in the soul. John maintains in this structure that the mystical union can take place during one’s lifetime. Finally in the structure of the overcoming of the depth of the soul Eckhart presents the breakthrough as the right understanding of the mystical union and John concedes that the union may take place only in the afterlife. Each of these structures may constitute – and in the history of ideas in fact did constitute – a core of a separate anthropology, but in their thinking these structures work together (I tried to show however that similar, although not identical, structures function also in Nietzsche’s thinking, which, considering the huge gap between fundamental presuppositions of Nietzche and the discussed mystics, can let us ponder the universality of these structures). Now why do Eckhartian and Sanjuanist mystical anthropology contain so many contradictions? It is so, I suppose, because their mystical desire of power accepts a given structure (and powers signified by it), then it grows weary of it so it overcomes it and endeavours to search for a new structure (and powers signified by it), then the process repeats itself etc.
The question arises: are the contradictions in Eckhart and John ‘simple’ contradictions or are they what may be called ‘paradoxes’? According to Encarta World English Dictionary a paradox is ‘a proposition or situation that seems to be absurd or contradictory but is or may be true’ (Quoted from: W. Byers, How Mathematicians Think. Using Ambiguity, Contradiction, and Paradox to Create Mathematics, Princeton University Press, Princeton 2007, p. 110). William Byers says that ‘in the situation of paradox the contradiction exists but we cannot accept closure of the case. The situation has two aspects that are irreconcilable but we cannot leave it at that – things must be reconciled. Thus, a paradox is a contradiction that is open, not closed’ (ibidem, p. 111). Using these descriptions of paradox, we can decisively say Eckhart’s and John’s anthropology in its core is full of paradoxes rather than contradictions. It is so because their thought wandering through affirmations of some power and overcoming them seems to be inevitable and in one way or another necessary for human existence. (It must be added that this process of wandering can be particularly visible when thinking, philosophizing or theologizing, does not distance itself from the natural rhythm of human existence). This wandering – which is a way of reconciliation of contradictory tendencies in life – seems to reflect human search for salvation that is rooted deeply in human existence: we affirm body in our daily life, then realizing its transitoriness we tend to overcome it and identify ourselves only with some spiritual element in us and finally we can also reject both the material and spiritual domain feeling some disgust for the being as a whole or for God. This rejection cannot last long, then we accept again the material and/or spiritual in us, etc. This is just one aspect of the relationship between paradox and salvation. But there is another: if we are aware that paradoxes are an inevitable part of our existence, then this awareness may set us free to a certain degree; giving freedom, it empowers us and in this sense brings us some salvation (in the phenomenological, above-mentioned sense of the word). Finally, there is still another possible aspect of relationship between paradox and salvation. The paradox has just been conceived as an inevitable element of human nature. But provided it is not a part of human nature but merely an expression of some mighty tendencies of it, then we could suggest elaborating a philosophical and/or a religious attitude in which we could try – through God’s grace, enlightenment or in other ways – to liberate ourselves from the paradoxes of our existence. Among other things, liberating of that kind would surely have to consist of a situation in which all the powers that we experience in our life, including the most hidden, the power of self-overcoming, lose their validity as powers. Affirmation of certain objects and their overcoming could still take place in our life – because we could not probably exist without affirming and overcoming – but they would no longer involve fascination for or deification of these objects. From now on they would become solely the objects of observation.