Ebook: A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War

The cold war is over. In the United States, the cold war shaped our political culture, our institutions, and our national priorities. But it also influenced the destinies of people everywhere. It divided Europe, split Germany, and engulfed the Third World. It led to a feverish arms race as massive sales of military equipment to poor nations. For four decades it left the world in a chronic state of tension in which one miscalculation could trigger nuclear holocaust.

Writing from a post-cold war perspective, the author presents a stunning new interpretation of U.S. national security policy during the formative stages of the Soviet-American rivalry. Blending economics, geopolitics, and ideology, integrating strategy and diplomacy, and analyzing U.S. policy in all areas of the globe, he gives us the most comprehensive history to date of the Truman administration's progressive involvement in the cold war.

At the center of the book is the struggle for power, but power not defined primarily in terms of military capabilities. In a subtly textured analysis of the mindset of American civilian and military officials, the author vividly shows how the lessons of World War II led policymakers to think of military power in economic terms. U.S. officials did not fear Soviet military power and did not think the Soviets would go to war. instead, they worried about financial disorder, economic dislocation, political upheaval, revolutionary nationalism, and the appeal of indigenous communism--all of which the Kremlin could capitalize on and thereby gain indirect leverage over the industrial centers of the Eurasian landmass, ultimately challenging the United States for world supremacy.

Accordingly, U.S. national security required initiatives to stabilize Western Europe, to enfold Germany and Japan into the American orbit, and it integrate advanced industrial economies with the underdeveloped periphery. For the first time, a study of national security policy puts reconstruction at its core and illuminates how economics and geopolitics were inextricably linked. In particular, the author shows how the struggle to promote recovery in the western zones of Germany dramatically influenced Soviet-American relations.

From this book there emerges a new view of Truman, the allegedly tough-nosed president fully in charge of developments. The author shows how poorly policy was formulated. Truman had little interest in making foreign policy, and allocated the task to his secretaries of state. He paid scant attention to the details of policy, simply prodding subordinates to resolve their differences. The result was a great deal of organizational rivalry and bureaucratic carping in spite of the commonality of purpose that infused U.S. policy.

Perhaps the most compelling aspect of the author's reassessment is his thoughtful and balanced critique of the overall policy of the Truman administration. In a nuanced conclusion, he assays its intelligent and imaginative initiatives as well as its many errors. In the end, he characterizes Truman administration officials as prudent men who sought to use U.S. power to safeguard long-term interests. He is both sympathetic and critical: sympathetic in believing their fears made sense; critical in claiming that their goals could have been achieved at much lower cost.