Ebook: Kept in the dark: the denial to Bomber Command of vital ULTRA and other intelligence information during World War II

Introduction -- Signals and intelligence -- Economic warfare -- Issues with bombing offensives -- Signals intelligence within the service ministries -- Air ministry intelligence -- Operational intelligence at HQ bomber command -- Signals intelligence within the 8th US Army Air Force in the UK -- The value of signals intelligence to the combined bombing offensive -- Post-war bombing surveys and other reports -- The final analysis -- Appendix A : Bombing targets for 1942 -- MEW -- Appendix B : Examples of RAF Y-service sigint against KG 40/Fw 200 operations -- Appendix C : Established officer strength of the Air Intelligence Directorate -- Appendix D : Air intelligence organisation -- 14 January 1941 -- Appendix E : Air intelligence organisation -- July 1942 -- Appendix F : Air intelligence organisation -- April 1944 -- Appendix G : Bomber command intelligence organisation -- end of war -- Appendix H : Jockey committee report -- Appendix I : Air ministry weekly intelligence summaries -- Appendix J : Bomber command andthe[sic] U-boat campaign : April 1942-March 1943 -- Appendix K : Extracts from decrypts giving effects of air attacks on German transportation -- Appendix L : Overview of DDI 4 activity -- Appendix M : Distribution of GC & CS air sigint intelligence reports -- Appendix N : Whitehall and the British bombing survey -- Appendix O : The end of the Third Reich, 1944-1945 -- Appendix P : The oil factor in German war effort -- Appendix Q : Airborne intercept of enemy R/T -- Appendix R : Comparison with Dowding.